In all my adult life, I have never witnessed a U.S. President forced to make a speech and execute a political campaign to reiterate how his administration is PRO-BUSINESS! Even the corporations who voted for Obama and contributed large sums of money are hoarding cash instead of investing in our economy. Why? It's very simple, no one in America has any confidence in our economy, the administration's flawed economic recovery strategy, job creation and unemployment, wasted stimulus money (1+ trillion) and the weakness and lack of confidence that this governement extrudes. Remember way back when George W. Bush was President and the liberals analyzed everything and every little report that happened in the Bush administration? Where is the Media now? Where is the detailed reports on unemployment, Katrina (oil spill), secrecy in the administration, favoritism, DOJ accusations, foreign policy, and a plethura of other issues? Anyone in the state run media should surrender their press credentials if they have any sort of conscience. I thought things couldn't be worse as when Jimmy "Jimmy cracked corn" Carter was President. I remember sitting in those long odd/even day gas lines waiting for my allotment of fuel for the '63 Mercury Meteor wondering if we would recover from that time. Fast forward to present day, I wonder now if we, as the greatest country on the face of the earth, will recover after the deliberate and calculated dismantling of our economy and life in general as we know it. I've said in past posts that I truly believe Obama is following the Cloward-Piven Theory how to bring down capitalism. It isn't that extreme of a concept. Even liberals and political pundits on the left are starting to question what the hell Barry O. is doing with the country? It is very obvious to me that Obama has a major chip on his shoulder concerning the United States of America. He has pitted whites against blacks, Americans and illegals, conservatives against the Obama regime and so on. Did anyone see visions of Reverend Wright in the Back Panther leader's speech. Hate, hate and more hate. Why did Eric Holder dismiss the voter intimidation case against this obvious Philadelphia racist? Could it be that DOJ doesn't see these types of cases as racists or hate crimes? Or is it they do not want to prosecute anyone of color, since they are simply victims. There are so many issues with the Obama administration that the media on both sides are having trouble keeping up with it. This Executive order to bring in Donald Berwick to head Medicare and Medicaid is ludacrist. He is a socialist! Even democrats are speaking out against this appointment. Barry doesn't care, he will do what he wants. A characteristic of a narcissist? You be the judge. Obama is out wasting taxpayer money traveling around attempting to convince the public that the economy is good, getting better and his administration is capitalism and pro-business. (Saul Alinsky is turning over in his grave.) Tell that to the people who can't find jobs or just graduated from college and find yourself working at Starbucks. If Barry O. keeps on this path, we will revert back to a deep recession (double dip) or in my dream of dreams, the republicans will take back the House and possibly, the Senate and make Obama a lame duck President for the rest of his term. This would minimize the damage he could perpetuate on America. God willing! This November, we must show up in great numbers and show the world that we are the greatest in the world. The conservative movement will persevere. America will persevere.
Obama stumping:
Feel the love:
Ignorance is, well Ignorant:
Savage with J. Christian Adams:
Obama underwater in Carville poll?
by Ed Morrissey
July 9, 2010
James Carville runs Democracy Corps, a liberal political-action group that also does regular polling on elections and issues. Normally it provides the Left with interesting, if not necessarily compelling, data for debate, but today’s poll results have plenty for the Right to discuss. Not only does it show Barack Obama underwater on job approval, it also shows that Obama has created a wide impression that he is a socialist in practice, as Jim Geraghty points out:
Deep in the poll, they ask, “Now, I am going to read you a list of words and phrases which people use to describe political figures. For each word or phrase, please tell me whether it describes Barack Obama very well, well, not too well, or not well at all.” …
When asked about “a socialist,” 33 percent of likely voters say it describes Obama “very well,” 22 percent say “well,” 15 percent say “not too well,” and 25 percent say “not well at all.”
In other words, 55 percent of likely voters think “socialist” is a reasonably accurate way of describing Obama.
That’s not the worst of it, though. In this poll, which had a 35/31 Democrat-Republican split — better than some media pollsters manage — Barack Obama sinks underwater on job approval, 46/50. More strongly disapprove (38%) than strongly approve (27%) of his job performance. Among likely voters, the gap widens to 45/51, with 40% strongly disapproving of Obama’s performance. The same exact splits occur on Obama’s handling of the economy, although those strongly approving drop to 22% among all respondents and 23% of likely voters.
On the Congressional ballot, the bad news continues for Democrats. The GOP wins overall on the question, 46/43, but among likely voters the split goes to six, 48/42. Twenty-six percent said there was “no chance” they would support a Democratic candidate, while 18% said “no chance” about the Republicans.
Americans remain pessimistic about the economy as well. Forty percent believe we have hit bottom and have started to improve. However, 22% say we’ve hit the bottom and are staying there, while 34% think we haven’t hit the bottom yet at all.
It probably doesn’t come as a big shock that Obama doesn’t get good marks on the oil spill, but it could be worse. His approval numbers on the spill almost mirror that of the economy and his overall approval, 43/50 in both likely voters and the overall sample. For those who disapprove, 66% say he’s been ineffective and 36% blame his bad leadership (the categories overlap, with multiple responses).
Perhaps most problematic, Obama can’t score a majority for any of the positive qualities listed by the pollster in the survey among likely voters. The best he does is a 49% for “hopeful vision” and the same for “strong leader,” both of which are ties. Otherwise, Obama sinks underwater on every other quality mentioned. The “socialist” label reflects that, but even more significantly for the midterm, 61% of likely voters think “big spender” fits well or very well.
Obama v. Arizona
The administration will have a tough time making its case against Arizona's immigration law.
BY Adam J. White
July 9, 2010
A federal lawsuit is never a laughing matter – especially when the U.S. Department of Justice signs the complaint. But the Obama administration's complaint against Arizona faces serious obstacles in the federal courts.
The administration needs to show that S.B. 1070, Arizona's law authorizing state officials to enforce federal immigration law, is "preempted" – that it runs afoul of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, which confirms that federal law supersedes state law. To that end, the complaint's opening paragraphs stake an uncontroversial claim: "[i]n our constitutional system, the federal government has preeminent authority to regulate immigration matters."
Certainly no one would dispute that the federal government is the "preeminent" architect of the nation's immigration policy. But it is quite another thing to say that federal law, through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, preempts S.B. 1070. In U.S. v. Arizona, the administration will have to prove the latter point – and that will be no small task.
The administration's primary obstacle is De Canas v. Bica (1976), in which the Supreme Court emphatically declared that federal immigration laws did not prohibit the states from enforcing the policies embodied by those federal immigration laws. (In that case, the state law was a California prohibition against the employment of illegal aliens.) The Court reviewed the text and history of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act, and found no indication that "Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens in particular." According to the Court, states may enforce laws consistent with federal immigration laws, so long as the state does not "impose additional burdens not contemplated by Congress."
Arizona drafted its laws with De Canas firmly in mind, as S.B. 1070's architect, law professor Kris Kobach, explained in a recent interview. In fact, Arizona's recent brief in a separate lawsuit makes this very point. Last month, Arizona moved to dismiss Friendly House v. Whiting, a class action lawsuit brought against S.B. 1070 by the ACLU and other groups. Responding in its motion to dismiss the lawsuit that was based on arguments that S.B. 1070 improperly regulates immigration, Arizona drew De Canas's crucial distinction: The ACLU is "confusing enforcement of federal immigration regulations (which S.B. 1070 seeks to accomplish) with enactment of Arizona-specific 'regulation of immigration' (which federal law would preempt)."
Arizona's brief lays out in straightforward detail the absence of any of the traditional bases for federal preemption of state law. As De Canas explained, the federal immigration statutes lack an express statement that federal law prohibits states from enforcing federal immigration law. Similarly, federal law does not so thoroughly "occupy the field" of immigration regulation that it leaves no room for state involvement in the federal statutes' enforcement. Finally, S.B. 1070 does not "conflict" with federal law: It neither interferes with the accomplishment of federal immigration statutes nor creates legal standards that contradict the federal statutes.
While the Obama administration phrased its complaint in broad terms, it appears to be framing this case primarily as one of "conflict" or "field" preemption. Namely, in administering the federal immigration laws, "the federal agencies balance the complex – and often competing – objectives that animate federal immigration law and policy," and that the "nation's immigration laws reflect a careful and considered balance of national law enforcement, foreign relations, and humanitarian interests." In fact, the Obama administration goes so far as to assert that S.B. 1070 prevents it from getting tough on truly nasty illegal immigrants: "S.B. 1070 disrupts federal enforcement priorities and resources that focus on aliens who pose a threat to national security or public safety ... undermin[ing] the federal government's careful balance of immigration enforcement policies and objectives."
But that line of argument wholly misses the point. When courts decide whether federal law preempts state law, the question is not whether the state law conflicts with the president's selective enforcement of federal statutes. The question is whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," as embodied by the federal statutes. S.B. 1070 satisfies that test – it does nothing more than allow state officials to enforce Congress's purposes and objectives as expressed in current federal statutes.
And while the Obama administration's complaint cites several federal statutes that stop short of levying upon illegal immigrants the sorts of criminal sanctions imposed by S.B. 1070 (e.g., humanitarian exceptions of asylum), it identifies no part of S.B. 1070 that specifically requires state officials or judges from incorporating those federal limits into their own actions, to the necessary extent. Indeed, by suggesting that S.B. 1070's sanctions against persons "unlawfully present" in the United States do not take into account federal asylum determinations, the Obama administration interprets S.B. 1070 in the worst possible light. But a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that courts should, whenever possible, interpret statutes in a way that minimizes or avoids such constitutional conflicts.
As it happens, the Supreme Court may weigh in on these types of questions long before the lower federal courts resolve the Obama administration's case. In the upcoming term, the Court will hear Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, which presents a similar constitutional challenge to another Arizona immigration-related statute – one that was signed into law, ironically enough, by then-Governor Janet Napolitano. In that case, the traditionally liberal Ninth Circuit ruled in Arizona's favor, holding that federal law does not preempt Arizona's law punishing employers that hire illegal aliens.
No one gets rich betting big against the U.S Department of Justice. Its lawyers are among this nation's very finest. But the Obama administration's decision to commence this controversial lawsuit will require them to put their formidable talents to the test.
Adam J. White is a lawyer in Washington, D.C.
Pathetic but funny:
Polls you live by:
26% Strongly approve of President's job performance % Strongly disapprove
Presidential approval index rating -17 difference
46% Somewhat approve
53% Somewhat disapprove
56% Oppose Justice Department getting involved in Arizona immigration law
61% Favor similiar immigration law in their state
Quote du jour:
I'm against a homogenized society, because I want the cream to rise.
Robert Frost (Take that Mr. Obama)
Writings of Our Founding Fathers
Federalist Papers
Federalist No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
From the New York Packet.
Friday, February 8, 1788.
Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.
PUBLIUS.
References:
http://www.hotair.com/
http://www.wnd.com/
http://www.nro.com/
http://www.weeklystandard.com/
http://www.thehill.com/
http://www..drudgereport.com/
http://www.politico.com/
http://www.youtube.com/
http://www.quotationspage.com/
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
http://www.wsj.com/
http://www.newsmax.com/
Adam J. White
Ed Morrissey
Maroules
Library of Congress/Federalist Papers
